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Evaluating Machine Learning Classifiers for Defensive
Cyberspace Operations
MICHAEL D. RICH, Air Force Institute of Technology
ROBERT F. MILLS, Air Force Institute of Technology
THOMAS E. DUBE, Air Force Institute of Technology
STEVEN K. ROGERS, Air Force Research Laboratory
Today’s defensive cyber sensors are dominated by signature-based analytical methods that require continuous maintenance
and lack the ability to detect unknown threats. Anomaly detection offers the ability to detect unknown threats, but despite
over 15 years of active research, the operationalization of anomaly detection and machine learning for Defensive Cyberspace
Operations (DCO) is lagging. This article provides an introduction to machine learning concepts with a focus on the unique
challenges to using machine learning for DCO. Traditional machine learning evaluation methods are challenged in favor of a
value-focused evaluation method that incorporates evaluator-specific weights for classifier and sensitivity threshold selection
specific to the values associated with cyber defense. A comprehensive unknown threat detection experiment is proposed to
quantify a classifier’s ability to detect previously unseen threats. The proposed experiments and evaluation methods are
applied to a Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) dataset to validate the methodology.

1. Introduction
In the age of big data, analytics, and cloud computing, the value of algorithms is being proven in
domains such as medicine, finance, and scientific research. This algorithmic value transfers to
Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). The current state of DCO relies heavily on signaturebased systems to detect threats against networks and computer systems. Signature-based
systems perform well identifying known threats and achieve low false positive rates when finelytuned signatures are used. However, these systems are incapable of detecting novel attacks for
which no signatures exist.
Anomaly detection is a commonly recommended solution to detect novel attacks.
Anomaly detectors are trained with normal data, then alert on patterns that do not fit the normal
model. This assumes it can differentiate between unknown threats and normal. A limitation
with this approach is that anomaly detectors target outliers of the normal model, but unknown
threats that occur within the normal model are overlooked. Similarly, benign activity may fall
outside the normal model. The result is false negatives and false positives, respectively. Even
when the anomaly detector can calculate a confidence measure, it will always make mistakes:
both false negatives and false positives.
Despite over 15 years of active research, the operationalization of anomaly detection
continues to lag in a market dominated by signature-based systems, regardless of seemingly high
levels of performance exhibited in research. Machine learning is a commonly used tool for
intrusion and anomaly detection research. While machine learning has been very successful in
some domains, there are unique challenges applying these techniques to DCO that do not exist in
other domains. Contributing challenges have been identified as (i) high cost of errors (time to
investigate false alarms and cost of missed attacks); (ii) lack of labeled training data (ground
truth); (iii) semantic gap between classification output and operational interpretation; (iv)
variability in input data; and (v) fundamental difficulties conducting sound evaluations1. The

1

Challenges are presented by developers of Bro, a leading open-source anomaly detection and IDS, in Sommer,
Robin and Paxson, Vern. "Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for network intrusion detection."
Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2010. 305-316.
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challenges of this domain require innovative machine learning solutions, as typical methods used
in other domains are not going to work.
This article focuses on the challenge of evaluating machine learning models used in DCO
applications. This article will provide an introduction to machine learning concepts, discuss the
specific challenges to using machine learning for intrusion detection, and recommend a ValueFocused Thinking (VFT) decision-making method to evaluate machine learning classifiers.
Empirical evidence is provided to validate the proposed value-focused evaluation method.

2. Background
In this section, an introduction to machine learning and classifier evaluation methods is provided.
A background of machine learning in the intrusion detection domain is also provided. Finally,
the VFT decision-making approach is introduced.
2.1. Introduction to Machine Learning
Machine learning is a multidisciplinary field that uses knowledge from the fields of artificial
intelligence, statistics, computational complexity theory, control theory, information theory,
philosophy, psychology, neurobiology, and others 2 . Machine learning focuses on learning
algorithms that build models from data that can be used to make decisions or predictions.
Machine learning can be considered a data-driven method of knowledge discovery, where
knowledge is contained within the model built by the algorithm.
Classification is one use of machine learning in which algorithms are trained to
discriminate between classes. To do this, data is arranged into individual instances comprised of
features. Feature selection (or feature engineering) is necessary to determine appropriate
features that allow for discrimination between classes 3 . Machine learning algorithms build
models during a training phase using training samples. Once the model is built, it is tested by
extracting the same features from a different set of samples which were not used for training.
Results from the empirical tests are reported as matrix of correct and incorrect classifications,
known as a confusion matrix (example shown in Table 1). From the confusion matrix, each
instance of the test data will be evaluated as a true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false
, recall
,
positive (FP), or false negative (FN). Metrics such as accuracy
precision

, and false positive rates

, can be derived from the matrix.

Table 1 - Two-Class Confusion Matrix

Actual

Positive
Negative

Classified as
Positive Negative
TP
FN
FP
TN

2

Mitchell, T. M. Machine Learning. 1st ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1997.
Kanter, James M., and Kalyan Veeramachaneni. 2015. "Deep Feature Synthesis: Towards Automating Data
Science Endeavors." Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA), 2015 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE.
3
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Most classifiers also have sensitivity adjustment, which can be viewed as a sliding scale
that can be used to fine tune the performance. Using a higher level of sensitivity will classify
more instances as positive, at the expense of more false positives. Conversely, using a lower
sensitivity will classify more instances as negative, at the expensive of more false negatives
(misses). Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are used to visualize the tradeoff
between true and false positive rates, and thereby establish an “optimal” 4 sensitivity setting.
Precision-Recall (PR) curves perform a similar function, showing the tradeoff between precision,
the rate of correctly classified instances to false positives, and recall, the true positive rate.
Many machine learning algorithms exist, such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs),
decision trees, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), and Bayesian networks5 . While the inner
workings of these algorithms differ, they can all be viewed as a black box with adjustable
settings used to create the “optimal” classifier model; the model with the best value for the
chosen evaluation metric. The process of selecting an optimal algorithm and settings is mostly
an empirical process. Using the same dataset, experiments can be conducted to compare
multiple algorithms using various settings for each, with the goal of declaring an algorithm
and/or settings as the optimal configuration for the dataset, with respect to a specific metric (e.g.,
accuracy, lowest FP rate, highest TP rate).
Beyond optimizing classifier settings, feature selection is another method of improving
classification results. Experimenting with various features for data being classified can offer
great insight and improve classification results. This typically requires a domain “expert” who
can identify an ideal set of features to discriminate between classes.
The two main types of learning algorithms are supervised and unsupervised. Supervised
learning algorithms are trained with data instances comprised of features that are labeled. For
example, training samples could be labeled as malicious or normal. The learning algorithm
performs statistical analysis of the features of each training instance to build a model that will
discriminate between malicious and normal. Unsupervised learning algorithms are trained with
data instances comprised of features that are not labeled. With no label provided for each
instance, the unsupervised classifier only determines similarity between instances. Anomaly
detectors primarily use unsupervised algorithms to create clusters of normal, labeling outliers as
abnormal.
Research methods in the field of machine learning are much more involved than
discussed here and require advanced statistical knowledge. This section is primarily meant to
prepare the reader for the following discussion on using machine learning for DCO.
2.2. Machine Learning in Intrusion Detection
Machine learning has made great strides in domains such as speech recognition, image
classification, and object detection 6 . Ground truth data, to train algorithms, exists in these
domains to produce good models. Many researchers attempt to use similar techniques for cyber
security, using data from audit logs, network traffic captures, system log files, and malware
4

The term “optimal” is used with the awareness of Wolpert’s “no free lunch” theorem, which there is no overall
“optimal” and the term should be expressed towards a specific problem and not generalized over all problems,
presented in Wolpert, David H. and Macready, William G. "No free lunch theorems for optimization." Evolutionary
Computation, IEEE Transactions on (IEEE) 1, no. 1 (1997): 67-82. There is no intent of refuting this theorem.
5
A technical review of common machine learning tools and techniques is well-presented in Witten, I. H., Frank, E.,
and Mark, A. 2011. Data Mining: Practical machine learning tools and techniques. 3rd ed. San Francisco: Morgan
Kaufmann.
6
LeCun, Yann, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. 2015. "Deep learning." Nature 521 (7553): 436-444.
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samples. Published research results often show relatively high classification results (greater than
95% accuracy in some cases), which leads us to question why anomaly detection systems are not
widely deployed in operational environments.
Machine learning only works well when the operating conditions are completely captured
by the training data. In the intrusion detection domain, the complete operating conditions cannot
be captured, which is preventing the operationalization of machine learning for DCO. This
requires innovation in how we choose to apply machine learning to this problem as the typical
machine learning experiment and evaluation methods are not going to work. The problem
should be reframed to account for the values associated with what we are trying to detect and/or
prevent. With signature-based detectors doing a satisfactory job detecting known threats, the
true need for machine learning is detecting unknown threats.
2.3. Detecting the Unknown Threat
The signature-based methodology is, and will always be, incapable of detecting novel attacks for
which a signature does not yet exist. Signature-based systems should not be dismissed as they
perform well for detecting known threats, but they should be augmented with machine learning
algorithms to enable detection of unknown threats7. The value of using the two systems together
can maximize classification of known and unknown threats. To truly understand the problem,
we need to discuss the differences between known and unknown threats from the views of a
human expert and a learning algorithm.
Much research has been conducted to operationalize anomaly detection8, the notion of
creating a model of normal then classifying outliers as anomalous. The terms “anomaly
detection” and “machine learning” are commonly intermixed, stemming from the common use of
clustering, an unsupervised machine learning approach, to the anomaly detection problem9. In
fact, these terms should not be considered the same because many machine learning methods
train using examples of both positive and negative classes, malicious and normal for example.
Sommer and Paxson10 relate the outlier detection method of anomaly detection to the
“closed world” assumption11, where outliers are assumed to belong to the negative class. The
authors continue to explain that domains where machine learning is successful rely on true
classification problems, using samples of positive and negative classes to train a learner. Finally,
the authors suggest that machine learning would be better suited for finding variations of known
attacks rather than discovering unknown attacks.
Symons and Beaver9 argue the semantics of variations of known attacks versus unknown
attacks or previously unseen attacks presented by Sommer and Paxson, taking the position that
normal traffic can be completely different from anything previously seen and that previously
unseen attacks may not appear anomalous in the original feature space, but may have
7

Dua, Sumeet, and Xian Du. 2011. Data mining and machine learning in cybersecurity. CRC press.
Bhuyan, Monowar H., Dhruba K. Bhattacharyya, and Jugal K. Kalita. 2014. "Network anomaly detection: methods,
systems and tools." Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE (IEEE) 16 (1): 303-336.
9
Symons, Christopher T. and Beaver, Justin M. "Nonparametric semi-supervised learning for network intrusion
detection: combining performance improvements with realistic in-situ training." Proceedings of the 5th ACM
workshop on Security and artificial intelligence. ACM, 2012. 49-58.
10
Sommer, Robin and Paxson, Vern. "Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for network intrusion
detection." Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2010. 305-316.
11
Witten, I. H., Frank, E., and Mark, A. Data Mining: Practical machine learning tools and techniques. 3rd ed. San
Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011.
8
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distinguishing features that are more similar to known attacks than normal traffic. Their
argument concludes by suggesting the problem is finding the correct view, and the appropriate
expert-derived feature set, through which these distinctions can be made.
We agree with the issues associated with the “closed world” assumption, while also
adopting the assumptions of Symons and Beaver regarding unknown attacks. We recommend
using supervised learning algorithms which are trained with labeled input data from both the
positive and negative classes. The algorithms develop a model to make classifications using
input features. The nonlinear combination of input features used to form the model may or may
not resemble that of the original feature representation. The similarity between known threats,
which the system has seen, versus unknown threats, which the system has not seen, is not a
simple variation of the known threat in the original feature representation observed by a human
expert, but a similarity in the internal feature representation of the classifier model. This
similarity in feature space may or may not represent a variation of a known attack or a novel
attack in terms of the original feature space which a human expert is familiar. While the
classifier’s representation may or may not align easily to a human’s representation, confidence in
the model can be gained through testing and validation.
Classifiers will never be perfect; therefore, the risk and costs associated with false
positives and false negatives must be assessed. This risk assessment is domain specific. The
cost of Amazon recommending a product that a consumer does not want to purchase differs from
the cost of a cyber operator researching false alerts. On the other hand, false negatives can be
equally or more expensive. The cost of Amazon not recommending a product to a consumer
may be a missed sales opportunity. A false negative in intrusion detection can result in a large
data breach of personal information.
Decisions made by machine learning algorithms should correlate to values specific to the
organizational mission and assets being protected. Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is a decisionmaking approach that can be leveraged to evaluate machine learning models, incorporating
explicit values into the selection and optimization of algorithms we use for cyberspace
operations.
2.4. Value-Focused Thinking
VFT is a decision-making approach from the operations research domain where values are
weighted in a manner that is relevant to the decision situations of an individual or organization12.
The basis is that decisions are made by considering values rather than simply comparing
alternatives.
Values are defined by the decision-maker (evaluator) and captured in a hierarchical
structure of tiers where lower branches represent sub-values of the parent values. The tiers are
also referred to as objectives, functions, tasks, and subtasks. All values are explicitly weighted
by the evaluator, with the constraint that weights in the branches of each tier must sum to one. A
simple mathematical function incorporates the provided weights and metrics for each value to
compute a score which is used to evaluate candidate decisions. The “best” decision is the one
with the highest score.
The VFT decision-making model is best explained with an example. A notional value
hierarchy for an automobile purchase decision is provided in Figure 1. In this hierarchy, the tier
12

Keeney, Ralph L. "Value-focused thinking: Identifying decision opportunities and creating alternatives."
European Journal of operational research (Elsevier) 92, no. 3 (1996): 537-549.
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1 values are safety, performance, and cost. The evaluator must provide weights for each of the
tier 1 values and the weights must sum to one. A notional weighting scheme is shown where the
tier 1 weights are .45 for safety, .30 for performance, and .25 for cost, summing to 1.0. The tier
2 values are the sub-values of the tier 1 values. Under the safety value, the sub-values are crash
ratings and safety systems. These sub-values must be measurable since they are the child nodes
in the hierarchy. A scaling system can be used for measurements that are not quantitative in
nature, such as a crash rating scale from 1 to 5. The weights for each sub-value branch must also
sum to one, as shown with weights of .50 for crash ratings and .50 for safety systems.

Figure 1 - Value Hierarchy Example

Using weighting schemes for values and related sub-values with a range between 0 and 1
produces an overall VFT score between 0 and 1. With the auto purchasing example, each
measureable sub-value would be multiplied by the tiered weighting scheme for each vehicle
subject to the decision. Each vehicle would receive an overall score between 0 and 1, the highest
overall score being the “best” purchase decision based on the value hierarchy and weighting
scheme used for the calculation. While this is a trivial example, VFT can be applied to more
complex decisions while maintaining an easily understood model for the average user or
manager to apply explicit weights.

3. Value-Focused Evaluation Methodology
Traditional classifier evaluation methods involve comparisons between metrics from the
confusion matrix and performance throughout a range of thresholds using ROC or PR curve
analysis. In this section, we propose using the VFT decision-making model to evaluate machine
learning algorithms rather than simply comparing alternatives of traditional metrics.

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol2/iss1/6
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Selecting a machine learning classifier and sensitivity threshold is a decision-making
process in which cost, benefit, and risk must be considered. By applying the value-focused
evaluation method, we can use evaluator-specified weighed values to compare classifier
performance. To use the value-focused evaluation method for a DCO application, we must first
build the hierarchy of values. At a high level, our values are to detect known threats to confirm
or deny alerts from a signature-based detector, detect unknown threats to identify threats that
the signature-based detector cannot detect, and maintain a suitable level of precision to ensure
our cyber operators are not overwhelmed by false positives.
The proposed value-focused evaluation method is motivated by a scenario-based
approach to mitigating insider threats 13 which considers benefits and costs associated with
implementing security controls to detect insider threat activities. The scenario-based approach
considered only binary security controls that were either on or off. This approach was extended
to consider attack classifications as scenarios and the adjustable prediction threshold ability
available in probabilistic machine learning classifiers. Figure 2 illustrates how the figures of
merit (FOM) are calculated, where
considers detection capabilities for each classifier by
considers the overall classifier performance
attack classification and threshold, and
across all attack classifications by threshold. This model easily extends to other applications
with adjustable sensitivity thresholds.

Figure 2 - Calculating Figures of Merit (adapted from (Mills 2011))

3.1. Value Hierarchy for Cyber Defense
The value hierarchy presented in Figure 3 represents the values relevant to using a machine
learning classifier in a hybrid IDS configuration with a signature-based system. The
fundamental objective is to select the optimal14 classifier threshold. To calculate scores for each
13

Mills, R. F., Grimaila, M. R., Peterson, G. L., and Butts, J. W. "A scenario-based approach to mitigating the
insider threat." Information Systems Security Association 9, no. 4 (2011): 12-19.
14
The term optimal is used again with awareness of Wolpert’s “no free lunch” theorem with no intent of refuting the
theorem.
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threshold, we consider the tier 1 values as the known threat detection rates, precision, and
unknown threat detection rates. Furthermore, we consider the detection rate for each attack class
in tier 2, allowing an evaluator to weight the value of detecting specific attack classes. The term
“attack class” is intentionally vague in this model to allow for interpretation to a specific
problem. For example, attack classes could be the signature category for IDS alerts, network
protocols for network-based IDS alerts, or the malware type for anti-virus systems. Any
categorical metadata available for the data could be used to define the sub-tiers.

Figure 3 - Cyber Defense VFT Hierarchy

The value hierarchy in Figure 3 leads to the calculation of each
from Figure 2,
then
the
optimal
threshold
setting
is
found
by
calculating
the
,
,...,
, where is the number of thresholds for classifier . The
optimal thresholds can then be compared across multiple classifiers to select the optimal
∗,
∗, . . . ,
∗ , where
classifier and threshold pair: the
is the number
∗
of classifiers and
represents the optimal threshold for classifier .
3.2. Experiment Methodology
Two machine learning experiments are conducted to capture performance metrics required to
compute
and
for the value-focused evaluation. A typical classifier performance
experiment is performed as well as an unknown threat detection experiment.
3.2.1. Classifier Performance Experiment
The classifier performance experiment is a typical stratified k-fold cross-validation experiment –
a preferred method of testing performance of machine learning algorithms15. Using stratified
15

Witten, I. H., Frank, E., and Mark, A. Data Mining: Practical machine learning tools and techniques. 3rd ed. San
Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011.

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol2/iss1/6
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.2.1.1005

8

Rich et al.: Evaluating Machine Learning Classifiers for Defensive Cyber Ops

cross-validation ensures the distribution of classes, threat and normal, is consistent across each
fold.
The goal of the cross-validation experiment is to evaluate each classifier’s performance
of correctly classifying the data instances as threat or normal. There is an assumption made that
each instance of the dataset used for training and testing is correctly labeled as a threat or normal,
and if it is a threat, the attack classification is provided. This can be achieved by using a
signature-based system for labeling of the dataset and using human expert verification of the
labels. Essentially, this experiment measures each classifier’s ability to match the output of the
signature-based system. Performance metrics for known threat detection and precision are
produced from this experiment.
3.2.2. Unknown Threat Detection Experiment
The unknown threat detection experiment is a unique attempt to quantify a classifier’s ability to
detect unknown threats. We are aware it is not possible to test for all unknown threats, as you
cannot evaluate the unknown. We can, however, simulate unknown threats by withholding
specific samples from each classifier’s training process, then testing the classifier on samples
which it has not been trained. Rather than hand-selecting unknown threats, leaving questions
whether the unknown instances were similar to other training samples, we present a
comprehensive approach similar to cross-validation, leaving less chance for misrepresentation of
a classifier's ability to detect the unknown.
Training and testing datasets are developed similar to the cross-validation method, except
folds are created for each attack classification rather than creating randomly stratified folds. All
instances of a specific attack classification are withheld as the test set while the remaining
instances are used as the training set. The test samples are unknown to the classifier as no
instances containing the same attack class was used for training. This process is repeated for
each attack classification, allowing each set of attack class instances the chance to be considered
as unknown threats. Therefore, our definition of unknown threat is an instance that contains an
attack classification in which the classifier has not been trained.
The unknown threat testing and training datasets are subjected to the same classifier
configurations used in the classifier performance experiment to allow for comparison of
performance measures from each experiment.
3.3. Performance Metrics
Performance metrics required for the value-focused evaluation are known threat detection rates
by attack class, unknown threat detection rates by attack class, and precision. An explanation
and formulas of each metric are provided in the following sections.
3.3.1. Known Threat Detection
Known threat detection, represented as
, is the classifier's ability to detect known malicious
is the recall rate from
connections of a specific attack classification. The metric used for
the classifier performance experiment,
,
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where , , and are the classifier, attack classification, and threshold, respectively. A high
will prove higher confidence when using alerts from the classifier to support true and false
positives from the signature-based detector. A perfect
would result in a classifier output
that perfectly matches the output of the signature-based detector. While impressive, this model
would not add much value over the signature-based detector alone without considering precision
and the ability to detect unknown threats.
3.3.2. Unknown Threat Detection
, is the classifier's ability to detect unknown
Unknown threat detection, represented as
threats of a specific attack classification. The metric used for
is the recall rate from the
unknown threat detection experiment,
,
where , , and are the classifier, attack classification, and threshold, respectively.
is
arguably the most valuable metric used to evaluate a classifier for use in a hybrid configuration,
alongside a signature-based system. The premise is if the signature-based system is well-suited
to detect known threats, then the primary value of using a classifier is to detect unknown threats.
A high
will prove higher confidence that the system is capable of detecting threats
undetected by the signature-based system.
3.3.3. Precision
Precision, represented as , is the classifier's ability to detect malicious connections while not
misclassifying normal connections as malicious. The metric used for is the overall precision
calculated from the classifier performance experiment,
,
where and are the classifier and threshold, respectively.
cannot be calculated per attack
classification as it considers FP metrics that do not relate to an attack class. A higher equates
to less FPs per alert. The perfect rate of precision is 1, where every alert will be a TP.
3.4. Value-Focused Evaluation Calculations
The final calculations are used to compute the score for each classifier and threshold. The
calculation used to compute each
from the value metrics discussed in the previous
section is
∑
∑
,
,
, and
are the evaluator-specified tier 1 weights for known threat
where
detection, unknown threat detection, and precision, respectively. The evaluator-specified tier 2
weights for each attack classification are represented as
, ,...,
, where is the number
of attack classes. Attack classes could be weighted differently for known threat detection and
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unknown threat detection. Weights must be selected so that the tier 1 weights sum to 1,
1, and the tier 2 weights sum to 1, ∑
, ,...,
1.
∗
The optimal classifier threshold,
, is then defined as threshold with the highest
∗

where
highest

max

,…,

,

is the number of thresholds. Each classifier will have an optimal threshold.
∗
Finally, the optimal classifier with threshold,
, is defined as classifier with the
∗

∗

where

,

∗

,

∗

,…,

∗

,

is the number of classifiers.

4. Preliminary Results
In this section, preliminary empirical results are provided using network-based intrusion
detection data. Traditional performance results are presented first using PR curve analysis,
followed by the value-focused evaluation results. The value-focused evaluation method is
validated using notional, but plausible, weighting schemes and comparing classifier selection
results with the traditional evaluation method. Fallacies are identified in these comparisons
which would lead to a less-than-optimal classifier selection for a specific value set if only the
traditional evaluation methods were considered.
4.1. Dataset Preprocessing
The data used in this research is from the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX), an annual cyber
warfare exercise sponsored by the US National Security Agency (NSA). Network traffic was
captured on the boundary router at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) for the duration
of each exercise16. The CDX data is in raw packet capture format (libpcap) and does not have
ground truth labeling of attacks. A total of 23,750,535 packets were available from the exercises
for years 2003 through 2007, and 2009.
Security Onion, a network security Linux distribution, is used as a sensor to process the
raw network data. Snort is used as the signature-based IDS, configured with the latest available
signature sets. Bro is used to extract connection-level features. Tcpreplay is used to replay the
network traffic over the sensor. Snort generated 732,709 packet-level alerts (3.085% of total
packets), with 169 unique signatures triggering from 16 attack classes. Bro logged 3,841,291
connections.
The features logged by Bro include connection-level statistics such as duration, byte
counts, connection end states, connection state history (TCP flags), and packet statistics. The
connections are labeled threat or normal by correlating the packet-level alerts generated by Snort.
If a packet is malicious, then the connection containing that packet is considered malicious.
Without manually verifying each Snort alert, we assume there are no false positives or negatives
in the set of alerts. While a large assumption, it is acceptable for this research as we are strictly
16

Mullins, Barry E., Tim H. Lacey, Robert F. Mills, Joseph M. Trechter, and Samuel D. Bass. 2007. "How the cyber
defense exercise shaped an information-assurance curriculum." Security & Privacy, IEEE 5 (5): 40-49.
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demonstrating evaluation methods without the goal of developing production-ready models. The
connection-alert correlation resulted in 146,531 connections containing one or more packet-level
alerts, 3.81% of the total connections. Even with a dataset collected in an environment where
attacks are imminent, the ratio of malicious to non-malicious connections is minuscule. It is
expected that this difference is amplified in a typical operational network, resulting in an even
larger imbalance between the positive and negative classes.
The data cleanup process involved removing timestamps, IPs, and port information so
these features would not impact the classification decisions. String-based features were removed
or converted to nominal features. No attempt to balance the positive and negative classes were
made, imbalanced data was used to better represent the target environment where there is an
expected imbalance between normal and malicious connections. Random sampling was used to
reduce the size of dataset to reduce computation time. All threat class instances were retained
and a 10% random sample of the normal class instances. A final dataset description is presented
in Table 2.
Table 2 - Final Dataset Description

Connections
384,129

Normal
237,598

Threat
146,531

% Threat
38.15

# of Features
34

4.2. Machine Learning Environment
The Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) machine learning suite from the
University of Waikato17 is used for both experiments. Six supervised classification algorithms
are used: BayesNet, Sequential Minimization Optimization (SMO), J48 decision trees, multilayer
perceptron (MLP) neural network, and adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) applied to BayesNet and
J4818. Parameter optimization is not considered in these experiments, therefore default settings
are used for each classifier.
4.3. Traditional Performance Evaluation
As discussed in Section 2.1, there are many metrics that can be derived from the confusion
matrix results of a machine learning experiment. For this article, PR curve analysis is used as the
traditional performance evaluation method. Similar to ROC curves, PR curves consider metrics
throughout all possible sensitivity thresholds. ROC curves depict a trade-off between TP rates
and FP rates, while PR curves depict a trade-off between TP rates (recall) and precision. PR
curves were preferred for this experiment as they are better suited to analyze imbalanced data,
where the majority class is the negative class19 .
The PR curves for each classifier presented in Figure 4 show the performance of each
classifier across the range of thresholds. By visual inspection alone, curves closer to the upper
right of the chart, where
1 and
1, are considered superior classifiers.
The curves for AdaBoostJ48 and J48 dominate the PR space at all thresholds, followed by
17

Hall, Mark, Eibe Frank, Geoffrey Holmes, Bernhard Pfahringer, Peter Reutemann, and Ian H. Witten. 2009. "The
WEKA data mining software: an update." ACM SIGKDD explorations newsletter (ACM) 11 (1): 10-18.
18
A detailed technical explanation of these algorithms along with configurable settings can be found in Witten, I. H.,
Frank, E., and Mark, A. 2011. Data Mining: Practical machine learning tools and techniques. 3rd ed. San Francisco:
Morgan Kaufmann.
19
Davis, Jesse and Goadrich, Mark. 2006. "The relationship between Precision-Recall and ROC curves."
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning. ACM. 233-240.
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AdaBoostBayesNet. Ultimately, once a classifier is selected, one threshold point along the curve
would be selected to deploy the model into a production environment. Confidence intervals of
points along the curve would also be considered in a more detailed analysis. The complete rank
ordering of classifier selection using a visual PR curve analysis would be AdaBoostJ48, J48,
AdaBoostBayesNet, MLP, SMO, and BayesNet.

Figure 4 - Traditional PR Curve Comparison

4.4. Value-Focused Evaluation
Unique to this research, as part of the value-focused evaluation, PR curve analysis is extended by
extrapolating detection rates by alert classification across the range of prediction thresholds.
This is accomplished by reversing the method used to correlate packet-level alerts to connections
after the instance has been classified. A mapping of alert classes to packets and from packets to
connections is maintained as part of the bookkeeping. This extrapolation produces the detection
rates for each alert class at everything threshold, metrics required for the value-focused
evaluation. A visual representation of a PR curve extrapolated by alert class for one classifier is
shown in Figure 5. While not entirely intuitive, the value-focused evaluation method provides a
means to evaluate each point on the PR curves by alert class for both the known threat detection
rates and unknown threat detection rates. With 16 alert classes present, there are 32 curves being
evaluated for each classifier and the evaluator is able to explicitly weight each curve. With this
intuition, we start to see the benefit in extrapolating these data points and weighing them
according to the value of detecting each type of threat. An organization will likely value
detecting command and control malware on their network over a port scan.
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Figure 5 - PR Curve Extrapolated by Alert Class

Notional weighting schemes were developed to demonstrate the value-focused evaluation
methodology. The weighting schemes and classifier selection results are summarized in Table 3
and are explained in detail below. Default alert classifications and priorities from Snort, shown
in Table 4, were used to generalize the tier 2 weighting into high, medium, and low priority
alerts20.
Table 3 - Value-Focused Notional Weighting Schemes and Classifier Selection

Weighting Schemes
Alert Class Priority
Tier 1 Weights
0.25
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.25
Tier 2 Weights
0.0625
0.14
0.0625
0.06
0.0625
0.01
Classifier Selection Results
AdaBoostJ48
AdaBoostJ48
J48
J48
AdaBoostBayesNet
MLP
MLP
AdaBoostBayesNet
BayesNet
BayesNet
SMO
SMO
Balanced

High Pri
Med Pri
Low Pri
1
2
3
4
5
6

20

Detect Unknown
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.14
0.06
0.01
MLP
J48
AdaBoostJ48
BayesNet
AdaBoostBayesNet
SMO

Explanations of Snort alert classes can be found in the Snort User’s Manual, http://manual.snort.org.
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Table 4 - Default Snort Alert Class Priorities

High Priority
attempted-admin
attempted-user
malware-cnc

Medium Priority
attempted-dos
attempted-recon
bad-unknown
misc-attack
non-standard-protocol
rpc-portmap-decode
susp-filename-detect
suspicious-login
system-call-detect

Low Priority
misc-activity
network-scan
not-suspicious
protocol-cmd-decode

4.4.1. Balanced Weighting Scheme
A balanced weighting scheme is used as a baseline, with the expectation that the classifier
selection ordering would mirror the traditional evaluation method. To achieve balanced
weighting on detection and precision,
and
are weighted at 0.25 each, summing to 0.50,
and is weighted at 0.50. To balance the weight across the 16 alert classifications, 0.0625 (1/16)
is used. The difference in classifier selection with this weighting scheme and the traditional
evaluation method is BayesNet is ranked fifth and SMO is ranked sixth, which is attributed to the
superior UTD rate from BayesNet. Otherwise, the rank ordering and overall classifier selection
of AdaBoost J48 is consistent with the traditional evaluation method.
4.4.2. Alert Class Priority Weighting Scheme
The alert class priority weighting scheme places emphasis on the default alert class priorities
used by Snort. High priority classes receive a weight of 0.14, medium priority classes receive a
weight of 0.06, and low priority classes receive a weight of 0.01. The weighting of alert classes
can be applied individually; the chosen weights are simply a notional application that is used for
demonstration. This weighting scheme does not take full advantage of weighting known threat
detection, unknown threat detection, and precision.
A significant finding in the classifier selection rank ordering from this weighting scheme
is that MLP is ranked higher than AdaBoostBayesNet. When analyzing the single PR curves for
these two classifiers, as shown in Figure 6, it is clear that AdaBoostBayesNet dominates the PR
space. The points on each curve represent the optimal threshold selected by the value-focused
evaluation. This demonstrates the fallacy that can occur when selecting classifiers without
considering detection rates by alert classification. By examining the detection rates by alert class,
the value-focused evaluation method determines that MLP is the superior classifier, whereas a
traditional PR curve analysis of would select AdaBoostBayesNet.
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Figure 6 - Value-Focused Threshold Selection for Alert Class Priority Weighting Scheme

4.4.3. Detect unknown weighting scheme
The detect unknown weighting scheme places emphasis on the detection of unknown threats by
using a higher weight of 0.50 for
and 0.00 for
. The weight for remains at 0.50 and
the alert class weighting remains set to the alert class priority weighting. This weighting scheme
would be plausible for a classifier intended solely for detecting unknown threats with a balance
of precision. The classifier selection for this weighting scheme ranks MLP the highest, with J48
now outranking AdaBoostJ48, and BayesNet now outranking AdaBoostBayesNet.
This weighting scheme further demonstrates how the value-focused evaluation method
can be used for classifier selection based on the intended use of the classifier, detecting unknown
threats in this case. The single PR curves for the top 5 classifiers, with the value-focused
threshold selections annotated, are shown in Figure 7. Similar to the findings with the alert class
priority weighting scheme, we see that a seemingly inferior classifier using traditional PR curve
analysis, MLP, is selected as the overall optimal classifier by the value-focused evaluation.
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Figure 7 - Value-Focused Threshold Selection for Detect Unknown Weighting Scheme

Conclusion
In this article, an overview of machine learning and the challenges applying machine learning to
DCO were discussed. While machine learning continues to be successful in some domains, we
continue to struggle operationalizing machine learning for cyber defense. One of these
challenges includes the evaluation of machine learning models. Cyberspace has proven to be
different from other domains; therefore, we need innovative evaluation methods for machine
learning models to be used in cyberspace operations. We provided a value-focused evaluation
method suited for this domain and provided preliminary results validating the usefulness of the
method.
Recommended future work is to apply the value-focused method to other cyber audit data
(e.g., host-based IDS, malware detection), employ the value-focused score metric to tune
classifier parameters to the evaluator-specified values, and to expand the default alert
classifications to allow an evaluator to further understand the detection capabilities of the
classifiers being evaluated. The dataset used in this experiment was very small compared to the
realistic daily amount of network traffic experienced in an enterprise. Further experiments on
larger datasets from an operational domain are needed for further validation of the value-focused
methodology. The potential of this evaluation method is to provide insight of threats to operators
in dynamic environments while allowing the operator to adjust weights of the model depending
on current situations. Further experiments in an operational environment should also monitor the
human-machine interactions to provide a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of the algorithms and the human operator.
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Disclaimer
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department of Defense, or
the United States Government
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